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Ian McKay and Jamie Swift. The Vimy Trap: Or, How We Learned 
to Stop Worrying and Love the Great War. Toronto: Between the 
Lines, 2016. Pp. 372.
This is intended to be a provocative scholarly work, but the clever 
title, the combative tone, the dearth of original primary research—all 
suggest that this is a polemic. Polemics can raise useful arguments, 
and there are some here. But scholarly work engages the existing 
scholarship, it does not dismiss it, or worse, misread it. To overstate 
the myth of “Vimyism” with its sinister overtones is the work of 
polemicists, not serious scholars.
The work’s tone is apparent throughout the book. Its authors seek 
to dismantle the “Vimy trap,” the narrative that somehow Canada 
became a nation on the battlefield of Vimy Ridge. But “Vimyism” 
is even more insidious. We learn that it is an orthodoxy driven by 
conservative politicians, soldiers, aging hockey coaches, and historians. 
We learn that Vimyism is dangerous for how “it wants us to return to 
a day of glorious battle” (p. 11). It is everywhere, from the hats sold 
by the Royal Canadian Legion to the attempts by “imperialist” city 
councillors to create a “Valour District” in Kingston, Ontario (p. 13). 
Vimyism even lurks within the writings of such prominent historians 
as Jonathan Vance and Tim Cook. If only Canadians understood the 
“childish irrationalism” of Vimyism (p. 263).
Such highly charged views of the present inform a selective study 
of the past. A rich historiography on the war’s origins and conduct 
is reduced to the simple premise that this was the first modern war. 
Present-day Canadians, McKay and Swift argue, forget that the war 
was not simply about Canada, and that the 60,000 Canadian dead 
were just a small fraction of the millions who died. In this they have 
a point. They then maintain that Canadians now ignore the war’s 
“moral complexity.” But there is nothing complex about McKay and 
Swift’s view of the war. The soldiers of a century ago, we are told, 
were largely “pacificists,” a modern label that describes those who 
condone war as “a last resort—and then only if undertaken under the 
auspices of legitimate international institutions (such as the United 
Nations)” (p. 116). It is unclear just how this label can be applied 
historically in any meaningful way.
Only through a very selective use of evidence do the authors 
trace the long road leading to Vimyism. They claim that the often 
gruesome and remorseful letters and memoirs that First World 
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War soldiers penned represented the true feelings of Canadians. 
That is impossible to know. The authors maintain that a rich peace 
movement swept across Canada through the 1930s (p. 129). That is 
true, but is it also true that, by the end of the 1930s, “Canadians 
had largely reached a consensus—even if expressed in a myriad of 
different ways—that the Great War had been an abomination that 
should never be repeated”? (p. 108) Did such a consensus linger after 
March 1939 after the Germans invaded Czechoslovakia?
Too often the search for Vimyism after 1945 reveals a dismissive 
view of warfare that leaves little room for nuance. We learn that the 
Korean War was “essentially a u.s. war” that did little but profit 
General Electric (p. 168). Aging war correspondents and school text 
authors also had little good to say about war in general, or Vimy 
Ridge in particular. Neither did filmmakers like Donald Brittain or 
Don Shebib, or the veterans they interviewed in the 1960s. Whether 
Canadians knew who Brittain or Shebib were is a question the 
authors do not ask. Even in 1967, the fiftieth anniversary of the 
great battle, the links between Vimy Ridge and nationhood were 
not yet tightly forged.
Certainly Pierre Berton helped pave the road to Vimyism in his 
1986 book, but even he concluded that Vimy was not worth the cost.1 
The authors admit that Berton’s lofty nationalist narrative has had 
its critics. Indeed, the authors refer obliquely to a book I co-edited 
a decade ago that challenged many of Berton’s more extravagant 
claims. Despite what the authors may believe, there has never been 
any academic orthodoxy about what Vimy Ridge represented.2
Still, two of our profession’s leading practitioners are targeted 
for contributing to a martial nationalism. The criticism is unfair and 
ill-conceived, for both Jonathan Vance and Tim Cook are accused of 
drawing the wrong conclusions from their own work. Vance makes it 
clear from the outset of Death So Noble (1997) that he is not writing 
about the war, but rather about the mythology that helped transform 
the commemorative landscape in Canada after 1918. Still, Swift and 
McKay condemn Vance for his “muted” criticism of the war (p. 217). 
They also dismiss Vance’s nuanced study of war memorials, arguing 
simply that “to go from funerary moments to a bold generalization 
1  Pierre Berton, Vimy (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1986).
2  Geoffrey Hayes, Michael Bechthold, and Andrew Iarocci, eds.. Vimy Ridge: A 
Canadian Reassessment (Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 2007).
2
Canadian Military History, Vol. 27 [], Iss. 1, Art. 6
http://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol27/iss1/6
  19C A N A D I A N  M I L I TA RY  H I S T O RY 
about one overwhelmingly dominant ‘memory’ seems hazardous” (p. 
218). At a stroke, the thousands of memorials Canadians built after 
the First World War are dismissed, as is the rich literature on war 
and memory that explores their meanings.
The authors’ attack on Cook’s work is even more curious. Despite 
the rich and often graphic detail in his two-volume history of the 
war, the authors maintain that Cook fails to acknowledge how truly 
unheroic and divisive the war actually was for Canada. In their view, 
Cook should have written another book that stressed modernism 
rather than nationalism. 
Occasionally McKay and Swift hit a mark. They are right that 
we need to understand the role of Canadians in the First World War 
within a wider framework. However, there is nothing very original 
here. Mark Humphries made that case in the Canadian Historical 
Review in 2014.3
Indeed, there are few original ideas in this book and too many 
sweeping generalisations and lingering prejudices. It may be fine 
for two scholars to attack “Vimyism” in a polemic but they cannot 
dismiss a rich, nuanced literature on the causes, experiences, impact 
and memory of the First World War and have their work considered 
serious scholarship.
geoffrey hayes, university of waterloo
3  Mark Osborne Humphries, “Between Commemoration and History: The 
Historiography of the Canadian Corps and Military Overseas,” Canadian Historical 
Review 95, no. 3 (September 2014): 384–97.
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